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CHICAGO v. PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD:
A CASE AGAINST MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
In the United States, legislatures of the individual states have authority over
the municipal corporations that exist within their boundaries, except as limited
by the federal and state constitutions. In Illinois, all municipal corporations
derive their power from the Illinois General Assembly,' the legislative branch
of the state. This branch may create any kind of corporation to aid in the ad-
ministration of public affairs and endow such corporation and its officers with
such powers and functions as it may deem necessary; 2 it is here that municipal
corporations are employed extensively and almost exclusively.
A municipal corporation is defined as "a public corporation, created by gov-
ernment for political purposes, and having subordinate and local purposes of
legislation." 3 It is a device of convenience utilized by state government to help
carry out the policy and laws of the state. The basic need for municipal corpora-
tions arose when the state realized that it could not cope with nor solve every
problem with which it is faced.
It has been recognized that:
[t]he municipal corporation acts . .. as the instrumentality of the
state in exercising powers and duties not strictly or properly local in
their nature, but which are in their essence state powers and obliga-
tions, and, therefore, to this extent it is a mere agency of the state .... 4
The state uses a municipal corporation to administer affairs affecting the local
community in the same manner as they affect all the inhabitants of the state.
However, the primary function of a municipal corporation is community
service through officers chosen by electors residing within the area the municipal
corporation serves. This unique feature of municipal corporations is best de-
scribed by this passage from McQuillin's treatise:
The fundamental idea of a municipal corporation in politics and
law is based on the fact that it is an artificial personality or govern-
mental organ-a body politic and corporate-created to regulate and
administer the internal or local concerns of the district embraced within
its corporate limits in matters peculiar to such place and not common
to the state at large. 5
Thus, the purposes of municipal corporations are two-fold: 1) to assist
state government by acting as the agent or arm of the state, and 2) its primary
purpose, to regulate and administer local affairs of the area within its boundaries
1 People ex rel. Gutknecht v. Chicago, 414 Ill. 600, 111 N.E.2d 626 (1953) ; People v.
Chicago, 349 111. 304, 182 N.E. 419 (1932).
2 Geneseo v. Illinois Northern Utilities Co., 363 Ill. 89, 1 N.E.2d 392 (1936) ; People v.
Bowman, 247 Ill. 276, 93 N.E. 244 (1910).
8 Black's Law Dictionary 1168 (4th ed. 1951).
4 1 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 1.108 at 391 (3d ed. 1949).
5 Id. at 390-391.
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for the benefit of the local community.6 The municipal corporation is thereby
a sovereignty within a sovereignty, local within the state, though limited by the
state in the extent of its governmental powers.
Now that it has been determined that a municipal corporation can exercise
governmental powers at least to a limited extent, we should examine exactly
how these powers are obtained. Under the doctrine of separation of powers,
each of the three branches of government, legislative, executive and judicial, has
a separate function to perform. A maxim of constitutional law further provides
that the legislative branch cannot delegate its law-making function to any other
body or authority.7 However, this maxim is not violated when a state legislature
vests a municipal corporation with the power to make laws for the purpose of
local self-government8 or as to matters purely of local concern. 9
Inherent in this principle, however, is the recognition of the distinction
between delegation to make the law and delegation to execute the law.
There is a distinction between the delegation of true legislative
power and the delegation to a subordinate of authority to execute
the law. The former involves a discretion as to what the law shall be;
the latter is merely an authority or discretion as to its execution, to
be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. It is an established
rule that the General Assembly cannot delegate its general legislative
power to determine what the law shall be. However, it may delegate
to others the authority to do those things which the legislature might
properly do, but cannot do as understandingly or advantageously.lu
Thus, the mere creation of a municipal corporation by the state to govern
matters purely of local concern is not to be treated "as a transfer of general
legislative power, but rather as a grant of authority to prescribe local regula-
tions, supported by immemorial practice, but subject of course to the interposi-
tion of the superior in cases of necessity."" This grant of authority is not a
delegation in the ordinary sense because the regulation of purely local affairs
is not understood properly to belong to the state in the first place.
To recapitulate, we have seen that the state creates municipal corporations,
but the municipal corporations have wide discretion in regulating their own
local affairs. We have determined that any delegation by the state to the cor-
poration's legislative body to regulate matters purely of local concern does not
6 Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U.S. 514 (1880) ; People v. Chicago, 256 Ill. 558, 100
N.E. 194 (1912).
7 1 Horack, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 303 (3d ed. 1943).
8 3 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 4.08 (3d ed. rev. 1963).
9 People ex rel. Adamowski v. Public Building Commission of Chicago, 11 11l. 2d 125,
142 N.E.2d 67 (1957) ; People v. Chicago, 413 I1. 315, 109 N.E.2d 201 (1952) ; People ex
rel. Curren v. Schommer, 392 IM. 17, 63 N.E.2d 744 (1945); People v. Springfield, 370 IlL
541, 19 N.E.2d 598 (1939) ; see also 16 Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law § 251 et seq. (1964).
10 Hill v. Relyea, 34 II. 2d 552, 555, 216 N.E.2d 795, 797 (1966) ; see also People v.
Warren, 11 IlM. 2d 420, 143 N.E.2d 28 (1957).
11 3 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 4.09 at 23 (3d ed. rev. 1963) ; see also Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations 264 (7th ed. 1903).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
require the usual express and strict standards required in a delegation to an
administrative body, a theory supported by immemorial practice. With this in
mind, we will now consider the distinction between a delegation of power from
the state legislature to a municipal corporation acting as a legislative body as
compared to a municipal corporation acting as an administrative body.
Delegations by the state to a municipal legislative body, i.e., the city council,
regarding matters of purely local concern have been traditionally accepted.1 2
It is also well settled that authority may be delegated by the state legislature to
administrative boards or officers provided the authority comes within the scope
of the delegating state statute.' 3 This latter delegation, however, requires definite
standards or a definite and reasonable rule for the guidance of officers in the
exercise of their discretion in administering the delegating statute.1 4 The standard
acts as a practical guide in determining whether an administrative act is within
the scope of the statute under which the administrator purports to act. It also
leads to better legislation by compelling the legislature to be exact in stating how
an administrative body is to execute the statute,15 thereby avoiding the use of
arbitrary discretion.
The basic reason for the requirement of a standard in a delegation to an
administrative body, while none is required in a delegation to a legislative body,
is the fact that the latter has an inherent control built into it, while the former
requires the standard as its control. The built-in control is the theory of gov-
ernment by consent of the governed. All legislatures in the United States, federal,
state and local, are composed of elected representatives of their respective areas.
The electors actually control these legislatures via the control they exercise over
their representatives, the legislators. If a majority of the electors feels the legisla-
tors are no longer doing the job entrusted to them, different legislators will be
chosen at the next election. This inherent control device applies to local city
councils, as well as to Congress and the state legislatures. Thus, while the dele.
gation of power to an administrative body requires the inclusion of a standard,
a delegation to any legislative body has its own device to prevent the abuse of
discretion by the legislators.
Furthermore, although a delegation may be broad in its nature and scope
in giving a legislative body general powers, it will not be struck down as un-
constitutional for failing to include a standard or guide.16 The reason for this
stems from "the necessity and desirability of delegating powers over local affairs
to those persons best acquainted with local needs . . ."17 to insure that only
the most useful and relevant legislation will be enacted.
12 See cases cited note 9.
13 3 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 4.11 (3d ed. rev. 1963).
14 Fisher v. Kemper, 1 1ll. 2d 603, 116 N.E.2d 332 (1954) ; see Recent Developments,
14 Stan. L. Rev. 372 (1962).
15 14 Stan. L. Rev. 372 (1962).
16 1 Horack, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 305 (3d ed. 1943).
17 Id. at 61.
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When deciding the case of Chicago v. Pennsylvania Railroad,1 8 the Illinois
Supreme Court either was unaware of, forgot or completely ignored the principles
discussed above. A further explanation may be that the court decided to change
the law and overrule sub silentio a vast number of cases and tradition itself in
holding as it did.
The city of Chicago enacted an ordinance' 9 which provides that:
no person shall . ..paint any . . . advertisement upon the . . gird-
ers, railings, gates or other parts of any public bridge or viaduct .. .
except such as may be required by the laws of the state and the or-
dinances of the city.
This ordinance was legislated pursuant to § 9-112 of the Illinois Highway Code.20
This statute provides that no advertising shall be placed on any bridge over
Illinois highways or over "any other highway other than such as may be directed
by the authority having jurisdiction over such highway." Under § 2-213 of the
Code, 21 the highway authority having responsibility over municipal streets is the
corporate authority of that municipality, the city council.
Basing its claim on the ordinance, the city sought to enjoin the Pennsylvania
Railroad from painting advertisements on the sides of the railroad's privately
owned bridges which traversed public streets in Chicago. This was a test case,
seven other similar actions having also been brought by the city. The trial court
issued the injunction to remove all existing advertisements and to enjoin all such
future advertising by the defendant railroad.
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed as a matter of law holding § 9-112 of
the Illinois Highway Code unconstitutional on its face "[d]ue to the complete
absence of standards to guide the exercise of discretion by the City in granting
18 41 Ill. 2d 245, 242 N.E.2d 152 (1968).
19 Chicago, Ill., Code § 36-30 (1939):
No person shall post, stick, stamp, tack, paint or otherwise fix, or cause the
same to be done by any person, any notice, placard, bill, card, poster, advertisement
or other device calculated to attract attention of the public, to or upon any sidewalk,
cross-walk, curb or curbstone, flagstone, or any other portion or part of any public
way, lamp post, electric light, telegraph, telephone or trolley line pole, hydrant,
shade tree or treebox, or upon the piers, columns, trusses, girders, railings, gates or
other parts of any public bridge or viaduct, or upon any pole box or fixture of the
fire alarm or police telegraph system, except such as may be required by the laws
of the state and the ordinances of the city.
20 IMI. Rev. Stat. ch. 121, § 9-112 (1967):
No person shall place or cause to be placed any sign or billboard or any adver-
tising of any kind or description upon any State highway other than such as may.
be directed by the Department, or upon any other highway other than such as may
be directed by the authority having jurisdiction over such highway. This provision
shall also apply to signs, billboards, or any other advertising except signs designat-
ing the name of the railroad and the clearance provided upon any bridge, other
structure, wire, cable, or other device, over or above such highway, whether con-
structed by the Department or others.
21 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 121, § 2-213 (1967):
Highway authority or highway authorities--The Department with respect to a
State highway; ...or the corporate authorities of a municipality with respect to
a municipal street,
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or refusing permission for the placing of advertising 'upon' ( . . . 'over') the
City's streets."1
22
In this writer's opinion, the court was wrong for various reasons. First of
all, and most importantly, the delegation by the General Assembly of power over
municipal streets to the city council of that municipality requires no standards
or guidelines. Since this is a grant of power to a legislative body, not to an ad-
ministrative body, the standards requirement does not apply. The city council
of any municipal corporation is controlled by the electors of the city who, if
dissatisfied with an alderman's work, will choose someone to replace him. This
inherent control applies to Chicago v. Pennsylvania Railroad2s where the alder-
men acting under the statute in question are liable to be replaced by the voters
in their districts at the next election. Thus, there is no need for a standard in the
statute.
Secondly, since this delegation of power to Chicago's City Council was held
invalid, the very concept and tradition of municipal corporations as governments
for local affairs have been destroyed. Chicago's City Council was performing its
primary purpose when regulating the local streets of Chicago for the benefit of
the local community. Chicago's streets are matters of purely local concern be-
cause they are peculiar to Chicago and are not common to Illinois at large. Only
Chicago's legislators can advantageously deal with the local needs of Chicago be-
cause they are best acquainted with those needs. Thus, a state delegation of
power to Chicago regarding control over the city's streets is valid. And since
the power was delegated to Chicago's legislative body, no standards were re-
quired. This has been the traditional view because the grant of authority to reg-
ulate purely local affairs is not understood properly to belong to the state in the
first place.
Next, the Illinois Supreme Court relied solely on precedents which involved
delegations of power to administrative bodies, not to a legislative body as in the
Pennsylvania Railroad case. Foremost in the court's opinion was O'Brien v.
State Highway Commissioner,2 4 which held a delegation to an administrative
body unconstitutional because of a lack of standards in the delegating statute.
This case, however, may be distinguished from Chicago v. Pennsylvania Rail-
road.2 5 The relevant part of § 9-112 of the Illinois Highway Code delegated
power to "the authority having jurisdiction over . . . such highway. '26 The
Michigan statute in the O'Brien case delegated power to remove signs to "the
proper commissioner or commissioners. '27 The difference between "authority"
22 Chicago v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 41 11. 2d 245, 241, 242 N.E.2d 152, 155 (1968).
23 Chicago v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 41 ]]1. 2d 245, 242 N.E.2d 152 (1968).
24 375 Mich. 545, 134 N.W.2d 700 (1965).
25 41 Ill. 2d 245, 242 N.E.2d 152 (1968).
26 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 121, § 9-112 (1967).
27 C. L. 1948, § 247.278; Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9.1408 (1958):
The proper commissioner or commissioners shall cause to be removed all signs,
guide posts, markers and advertising devices that have not been duly authorized.
Any person, firm or corporation who erects or maintains, or causes to be erected or
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and "commissioner" may appear slight at first blush, but it is extremely mate-
rial. It is clear that the authority over Chicago's streets is Chicago's City Coun-
cil; § 2-213 of the Illinois Highway Code grants the power to the corporate au-
thority of the municipality, which in Chicago is the City Council, a legislative
authority. The Michigan statute granted power to a commissioner, which can
only mean to an administrative head, department or body. The very meaning
of the word limits its use to this function.28 This sufficiently solidifies the position
that standards were not required in the Pennsylvania Railroad case because no
administrative body was involved.
The Illinois Supreme Court also relied upon Hoyt Bros. v. Grand Rapids.29
Here the court invalidated a city ordinance on the ground that no standards were
included therein to guide the city manager when granting permits to solicit funds
for charitable purposes. In a cursory examination of the Pennsylvania Railroad's
appellate brief filed with the Illinois Supreme Court, the case of Pure Oil Co. v.
Northlake0 was discovered as relied upon by the defendant railroad, though it
was not cited by the court in its opinion. In this writer's opinion, the Illinois
Supreme Court held invalid a delegation by the city council of Northlake, a leg-
islative body, which purported to vest an administrative body of the city council
with the power to deny, without any standards or restrictions, permission to con-
struct driveways across public walks. Since the city council can act either as a
legislative or administrative body, and since issuing driveway permits is nor-
mally an administrative function, this decision thereby satisfies the requirement
that standards must be included in a delegation from a legislative to an admin-
istrative body, even when the delegation occurs within the same entity.
These two cases invalidated city ordinances delegating power to adminis-
trative bodies because no standards were included in the ordinances. In the Penn-
sylvania Railroad case, however, the court went one step further and held invalid
the Illinois statute upon which the city ordinance was based; no decision was
made regarding the Chicago ordinance itself. But this statute required no stan-
dards because there was no delegation to an administrative body, as there was
in the Hoyt Bros. and Pure Oil cases. These two cases then actually provide fur-
ther authority for the rule that standards are needed only when delegations of
power are made to administrative, not legislative, bodies.
Finally, since § 9-112 of the Illinois Highway Code has been held invalid
for a lack of standards, most of the General Assembly's delegations of powers
to municipal corporations should likewise be doomed. Chapter 24 of the Illinois
maintained, any sign, guide post, marker or advertising device in violation of the
provisions hereof, or who injures, defaces or removes any sign or guide post erected
or maintained by the proper highway commissioner or commissioners, or with his
or their consent, shall be liable for the expense occasioned by such unlawful act.
28 Webster's Third New International Dictionary 456 (1964):
Commissioner . . . the representative or agent of the sovereign power or govern-
mental authority in a district, province, or other governmental unit often having
both judicial and administrative powers.
29 260 Mich. 447, 245 N.W. 509 (1932).
80 10 Ill. 2d 241, 140 N.E.2d 289 (1957).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Revised Statutes deals generally with all the grants of power to municipal cor-
porations, but no section therein can be found to contain any standards or guide-
lines. For example, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 24, § 11-80-2 (1967) reads, "the corporate
authorities of each municipality may regulate the use of streets and other mu-
nicipal property." Ill Rev. Stat. ch. 24, § 11-80-11 (1967) provides that "the cor-
porate authorities of each municipality may provide for and regulate cross-walks,
curbs, and gutters." Should these sections, as well as many others, which read
nearly the same in form, be held invalid because no standard appears? No, of
course not. Standards required in a delegation of legislative power to a legislative
authority would be impracticable if not impossible. The Illinois General Assembly
cannot legislate for each individual municipality and its peculiar needs. This
function should be left to the legislative bodies of each municpial corporation.
Thus, it can safely be said that the decision in Chicago v. Pennsylvania
Railroad8 l has thrown the state of the law in the area of delegations of power
to municipal corporations into utter confusion. It is inconceivable that the Illi-
nois Supreme Court intended to invalidate or cause the eventual invalidation of
most of Chapter 24 of the Illinois Revised Statutes. However, this conclusion
can logically be drawn from the holding in the Pennsylvania Railroad case. Only
future decisions will clarify the position taken by the court in this case. However,
clarification will not justify the result that was reached.
PAUL L. PRICE
81 41 IMI. 2d 245, 242 N.E.2d 152 (1968).
